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Abstract 
 
 
This paper aims at evaluating the liberalization policies effects on inequality in Egypt 
with respect to gender, region and qualification level. No previous studies in Egypt, 
to our best knowledge, have used the Microsimulation analysis which is a good tool 
that allows such an evaluation and determines the redistribution aspects of macro 
policies. The latter consists of linking macroeconomic changes to the micro level of 
the economy i.e. the individual level. A Computable General Equilibrium model 
(CGE) is first estimated for a maximum tariff rate of 10%. And, wages and 
employment changes resulted from the CGE are replicated, in a second stage, into 
our micro data. Results show that liberalization policies have important impacts on 
inequalities among the Egyptian population in general. Inequality has decreased 
among males and females as well as among different regions of the Egyptian society 
but has increased among high-skilled and low-skilled workers. Results of the present 
research have important policy implications that have to be considered.  
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1 Introduction
Macroeconomic policies, poverty and gender specific aspects must be present in the
overall policy dialogue. Thus, analyzing trade liberalization impacts on the labor mar-
ket and wage inequality are central for policymaking reforms in developing countries. In
Egypt, the 1990’s have been characterized by an accelerated structural adjustment and
trade liberalization aiming at rectifying the macro imbalances in the Egyptian economy.
Those economic policies are parts of the agreements that the Egyptian government has
signed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank aiming at recti-
fying the macro imbalances in the Egyptian economy. Theoretically, Becker (1957) argues
that free trade implies a more competitive environment and, consequently, a less discrim-
inating economy (against females). However, such effects have not been observed in most
developing countries (see El-Hamidi, 2008). The present study aims at identify the com-
plex inter-linkages between trade liberalization policies, inequality, wages and employment
opportunities through a microsimulation methodology.
Our motivation is twofold: economic and empirical interests. On the one hand, Egypt,
witnessing both macro and microeconomic changes during the last decade, has undertaken
numerous policies that affected both trade and, in turn, labor market and wages inequality.
Despite many efforts that have been deployed to combat it, inequality remains a serious
issue in Egypt. According to the World Bank (2005), the Gini index in Egypt is 32.1.
More precisely, the income share held by the lowest 10% of the population is 3.7% and
the one held by the lowest 20% is 9%. Those figures are much higher for the highest
20% and 10% (44% and 30% respectively). Such inequality is observed on many levels:
qualification, gender and geographic levels.
Although women’s situation has highly improved, they still earn less than men. Be-
tween 1998 and 2006, the gender pay gap increased in the public enterprise sector in favor
of men to reach levels comparable to the private sector. Concerning the gender level of
inequality, Said (2007) has found that, after correcting productivity differences, there is
a gap in favor of females is only 3% in government sectors and the gap in favor of males
in the private sector is 21%. Therefore, inequality on the gender level is still a debatable
issue in Egypt. In fact, such inequality becomes more important when trade policies are
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taken into account as females work for the government which is a non-tradable sector. El
Hamidi (2008) has also found that, during trade liberalization periods, tradable sectors
experienced higher levels of wage differences between men and women than non-tradable
ones.
On the geographic level, such inequality is even more pronounced as urban employment
represent more than 65% of the whole employment. Said (2007) has shown that living
outside greater Cairo is associated with a wage disadvantage for all sector and gender
groups.
Finally, inequality between skilled and unskilled is also a key aspects to understand
income differences in developing countries in general and in Egypt in particular. Wage
inequality and the returns to skills rose substantially as there was a sizable increase in
the wage ratio between highly skilled and less skilled workers. Borjas and Ramey (1195)
and Epifani and Gancia (2007) have shown that international trade can raise the relative
demand for skilled labor and therefore increasing the wage skill premium.
Regarding the empirical motivation, we rely for the first time to our best knowledge, on
a microsimulation approach using Egyptian data. This framework uses in the meantime a
discrete choice model of labor supply and a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model
by linking the Egyptian Labor Market and Panel Survey (ELMPS) of 1998 to the Social
Accounting Matrix (SAM) of 2001.
To put in a nutshell, our research objectives could be summarized in the two follow-
ing questions: first, how do trade liberalization measures affect the income redistribution
(and hence poverty and inequality between different labor segments) and secondly, to what
extent trade liberalization policies are efficient for females’ wages and employment oppor-
tunities (compared to those of males). Therefore, using the microsimulation approach, we
try to determine the effect of trade liberalization on the wage inequality according to the
three criteria: gender, qualification level and region.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents some stylized facts of the main
liberalization changes that took place in the Egyptian economy between 1998 and 2004.
Section 3 exhibits the methodology adopted in our study. Section 4 is devoted to the data
presentation. In section 5, we present the results. And, section 6 concludes and presents
the policy implications of the study.
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2 Some Stylized Facts
Since the beginning of 1990’s, Egypt had two remarkable waves of trade liberalization.
The first one took place in the beginning of 1990s as it undertook a reform policy on many
fields thanks to the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustments Program (ERSAP)
dictated by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Thus, it has opened
its economy, increased its trade and privatized many state-owned companies. As shown
in figure 1, the maximum tariff rate in Egypt decreased from 110 percent in the end of
1980’s to reach 40 percent in the end of 1990’s.
[Figure 1 about here]
In addition to these tariff cuts, in 2004, the government of Egypt has launched the
second wave of liberalization. Its objectives were twofold: first, to reduce tariffs and
rationalize the tariff structure; and second, to reduce the number of products subject to
non-tariff barriers. Figure 2 presents tariffs reduction in nominal and effective terms for
manufacturing sectors. It is quite obvious that both nominal and effective protection has
declined for almost all manufacturing sectors after 2004 reform. Therefore, the second
wave had many crucial implications as it reduced tariff dispersion, tariff lines and tariffs
average. Tariff dispersion has decreased from 27 tariff brackets to 6, which in turn would
simplify procedures, minimize tariff evasion, and remove possibilities of discretion and
corruption. Moreover, tariff lines were reduced from 8000 to 6000 which also adds to the
simplification of procedures. Finally, the tariff cuts decision stated that the average tariff
rate will be reduced from 14.6 percent to 9 percent, which is less than the average of 42
percent in 1991 and 25 percent in 1995.
[Figure 2 about here]
Consequently, as Egypt had a considerable success in implementing its trade policy
goals, its external trade has significantly increased. Figure 3 shows exports and imports
trends for goods and services. Exports of goods have been boosted by 41.4 percent between
1990 and 1999 and then by 110.6 percent between 2004 and 2007. Obviously, thanks to
the second wave, the exports growth rate is much higher than the first one. Having a quick
glance on the sectoral and the gender distribution of trade between 1998 and 2005, the
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most important sectors witnessing a significant expansion are: transportation equipment
(up by 950 percent), food products (up by 425 percent), electrical machinery (up by 268
percent) and chemicals (up by 8.11 percent). Employment opportunities for women have
increased in these sectors also by 143 percent, 209 percent, 268 percent and 333 percent
respectively. Obviously, such relationship between sectors expansion and females’ work
needs to be assessed within an empirical framework.
[Figure 3 about here]
Moreover, Figure 4 (El-Hamidi, 2008) explores the Egyptian sectors by gender in 1998
and 2006. The latter shows an important females concentration in the education and
health sector, the retail and trade sector and the textile manufacturing sector. Those
sectors are then more feminized than others; which could have important implications
on the analysis of the liberalization impacts on females employment. Therefore, such an
evaluation is crucial to determine not only the impact of trade liberalization on income
redistribution and specifically on the evolution of females’ poverty but also on wages and
employment opportunities of both males and females in the labor market.
[Figure 4 about here]
Table 1 displays the distribution of the working population of our sample by segment 1
and economic working sector. Five economic sectors are considered here: the Government,
the Agriculture sector, the Mining sector, Manufacture and the service sector. Statistics
shown in this table are constructed using the Egyptian Labor Market Survey (ELMS)
of 1998. Considering the government sector, we observe that 65% of the workers are
males against only 25% of females. However, this proportion of females seem to be high
compared to the Agriculture and the mining sectors employing very few women (only 6%
and 0% respectively). In addition to this, it is quite clear that the government, contrarily
to the other sectors, is characterized by a majority (80%) of a skilled working population.
[Table 1 about here]
1Segments are: 1. High skilled males in urban areas; 2. Low skilled males in urban areas; 3. High
skilled males in rural areas; 4. Low skilled males in rural areas; 5. High skilled females in urban areas; 6.
Low skilled females in urban areas; 7. High skilled females in rural areas; 8. Low skilled females in rural
areas.
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3 Methodology
3.1 The Microsimulation Model
The main role of the microsimulation module in the linked framework is to provide a
detailed computation of net incomes at the household level, through a detailed description
of the tax-benefit system of the economy, and to estimate individual behavioral responses
to the policy change (see Colombo, 2007).
The literature on microsimulation models has shown that there exists three main ways
to undertake a microsimulation analysis2. The first one is “the integrated approach” or
the micro-accounting methodology where the representative household groups are substi-
tuted by the real number of households available in the microeconomic survey. Such a
method has a clear shortcoming: it does not take into account the behavioral responses.
This why, we use the second method which is the “Top/Down approach” where some
micro-econometric work is done in order to take into account the individuals behavior
(Bourguingnon et al, 2003). The third method, which is the “Top/Down Bottom/Up ap-
proach”was developed by Savard (2003), where there is a bi-directional link between the
micro and macro levels through many iteration until they converge to the same solution.
In our study, we use the“Top/Down approach”as it gives a relatively good compromise
between simplicity, consistency while taking into account the behavior of individuals on
the micro level.
In the empirical work of the present study, we opt, in a first stage, for probit model of
participation. Discrete choice models have been a growth industry in econometrics and,
the availability of high quality data sets on microeconomic behavior has maintained an
interest in extending them. This modeling technique reveals the relationship between the
probability of choosing between two or more alternatives and the attributes that charac-
terize the choice made. Our model counts two different labor market status alternatives,
and each agent is found to be in one of these conditions: being inactive or being an active
2For a detailed literature review on the comparison of those methodologies and their implications, see
Colombo (2008)
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individual. The equations of the model are the following:
Two-stage Heckman selection model:
log(wls) = αl(ls) + βl(ls).Zls + θl(ls).λls + νls (1)
The wage equation computes the logarithm of labor income wls of individual l belonging
to the subgroup s3 as a linear function of his/her personal characteristics (vector Zls) and
of λls, which represents the inverse Mills ratio estimated for the selection model. The
residual term νls describes the effects of unobserved components on wage earnings. This
equation is estimated separately for each subgroup.
The first stage of the Heckman’s model consists of determining the individuals prob-
ability of participation. In our model we have arbitrarily set to zero the utility of being
inactive. Vector Z of explanatory variables includes some personal characteristics of in-
dividual l of the subgroup s. The equation is defined only for individuals at working age
(15-65 years old) and estimated separately for each subgroup. The explanatory variables
are the age, the age squared, the marital status, the household’s size and dummies for
parental levels of education.
The aim of this equation in the model is to obtain efficient estimates for labor incomes
only for those individuals that are observed to be inactive in the survey. These estimates
are used in the case that, after a liberalization policy takes place, one or more of them will
change their labor market status and become active. In this case, using these estimates,
we will be able to assign a labor income to individuals that have changed their labor
market status after the simulation run. For all the other individuals that are observed to
receive a wage or to earn a positive income from their activity, we use instead the observed
wage and income levels.
3Six subgroups are considered here: 1. Males; 2. Females; 3. Skilled; 4. Unskilled; 5. Urban and 6.
Rural.
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3.2 The Macroeconomic Model
3.2.1 The Model Assumptions
CGE models are powerful tools to capture, in a general equilibrium framework, all
direct and indirect effects of macroeconomic shocks (wherever the shock occurs in the
economy) on sectoral production and factor demands. This is why we use a CGE model
that was constructed by Decaluwe´ et al. (2001) to assess the impact of different economic
policies on developing countries. The central assumption is that the economy is a small
open one which has no influence on world prices (price taker). Such assumption is consis-
tent with the Egyptian economy. Moreover, it is a perfect competition model, therefore
the profit maximization condition implies that the price of production factor is equal to
its marginal productivity. The model belongs to real models where the currency is an in-
strument of exchange and a unit of account only. Therefore, the currency remains neutral,
meaning that price changes affect only the decisions of production and consumption. All
Prices are normalized in the benchmark scenario. Regarding the factors of production, the
labor is perfectly mobile between production sectors, while capital is specific to each one
of them. They are internationally immobile. Hence, factor endowments are not affected
by resources transfers with the Rest of the World. Regarding labor mobility, the number
of Egyptian international migrants is estimated at 4% of the Egyptian population and
1.5% of world migrants (Nassar, 2005). Such proportions show to what extent the labor
immobility assumption holds in our case. By contrast, international capital mobility as
well as internal labor migration (from rural to urban areas) are one of the most important
issues for the Egyptian economy. As we are trying to capture the effect of trade liberal-
ization, such aspects are not in the center of the present paper. However, future research
should extend this model in order to take these issues into full consideration.
The existence of foreign savings has no impact on the volume of productive capital.
Industries use not only production factors but also intermediate products from other
activities. Households allocate their revenues between consumption and savings and and
firms allocate them between investment and savings. Exported goods and those sold
on the domestic market are not identical, which leads to an elasticity of transformation
among the two commercial products. Reflecting the nature of the classical framework,
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competition and resource allocation are adjusted through the flexible movement of prices.
3.2.2 The Model Structure
This CGE model has common features with other CGE models as follows. Production
factors (labor and capital) are complementary in the value added following a Constant
Elasticity Substitution (CES) function (with constant returns to scale). A perfect com-
plementarity (a` la Leontief, i.e. technical substitution elasticity is zero) exists between,
on the one hand, intermediate inputs and, on the other between intermediate inputs and
production factors or value added. Each market satisfies the neoclassical hypothesis of
perfect competition: perfect homogeneity of labor force, perfect sectoral and geographical
mobility.
Modeling the labor market is an essential aspect of our model. As we are interested in
determining the impact of trade policy on the inequality based on three criteria: gender,
region and qualification level, we have developed a nested CES function between different
segments as shown in Figure 6. The unique labor factor is disaggregated into rural and
urban labor in the first level of the nested CES. These two types of labor are imperfect
substitutes in sectoral production, with identical elasticities of substitution in each sector
4. Afterwards, in each group (rural and urban), there is a CES between males and females.
Finally, the third level is the one between skilled and unskilled workers. Such a modeling
allows us to take into account the imperfect substitutability between different segments.
Each level of the CES yields different wages between different segments.
[Figure 6 about here]
Households maximize their utility function represented by a Linear Expenditure Sys-
tem (LES) subject to their income constraint. Consequently, expenditure on the ith com-
modity consists of expenditure on the minimum required quantity for that commodity plus
the proportion of the budget which is left over after paying for all minimum requirements.
This proportion is the marginal budget share that determines the allocation of supernu-
merary income. Domestic production is distributed between domestic consumption and
4We use the same elasticity of substitution for all sectors. However, substitution between male and
female work may be greater in some sectors than others. Unfortunately, the lack of available data on
these parameters justifies the use of uniform elasticities in different sectors.
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foreign exports through a Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) function. Imports
are differentiated by origin following an Armington-function. The latter is combined with
domestic production through a CES function to satisfy domestic demand. Firms have
revenues coming from capital remuneration and transfers. Their expenditures are divided
between investment cost and transfers to households. Households and firms pay taxes to
government. Moreover, many transfers are made among economic agents, i.e. households,
firms, government and the rest of the world.
The main closure rules are introduced in order to fit the Egyptian economy. Gov-
ernment expenditures in goods and services are assumed constant in real terms. Capital
is specific to each sector. All transfers, public wages and public employment are con-
stant. On the external level, the current account balance as well as international prices
are assumed fixed (Egypt is modeled as a small open economy). Therefore, exchange rate
adjusts in order to satisfy this constraint. The producer price index is the nume´raire.
Welfare is measured through the equivalent variation that is based on household con-
sumption. Appendices 2 and 3 present respectively the model structure, its notation and
its equation.
3.3 Linking the Two Models
The basic difficulty of the microsimulation approach is to ensure consistency between
the micro and macro levels of the analysis. A growing literature highlights the linking
macro- micro models (see Ahmed and Donoghue 2004). And the main reason for such a
linking is the need to conduct the micro analysis of changes in macroeconomic policies.
In this conventional macro- micro literature, integration of CGE and microsimulation
models has received the largest share of exposure and discussions. However, it is still a
relatively new field in both developed and developing countries. We integrate a CGE and
a microsimulation model so that a shock to the CGE model (such as changes in tariffs)
transmits the changes in wages, prices and employment levels to the microsimulation
model. In order to link the macroeconomic CGE model and the microeconometric model,
some accounting equations have to be computed.
First, the total household h’s net income Y Hh is defined by the sum of the labor
income of its members Y Lhl (with Wdumhl a dummy variable equals 1 if individual l
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is a wage-worker and 0 otherwise), any exogenous income Y Xh, i.e. transfers from the
government or the rest of the world to the households net of direct taxes TDHh as follows:
Y DHh =
8∑
l=1
Y Lhl.Wdumhl + Y Xh − TDHh (2)
In order to compute the real income, a household specific consumer price index has
to be calculated by adding the composite price PCi of commodity i weighted by the
budgetary share allocated to this commodity over the 16 sectors of the economy:
PCIh =
16∑
i=1
γhi.PCi (3)
Dividing the nominal income by the PCIh yields the household’s real income Y HRh:
Y DHRh =
Y DHh
PCIh
(4)
Once those variables are computed, the microsimulation can be run and two main
changes are taken into account.
First, the change in average earnings in the microsimulation must be equal to the
changes in the wage rate generated by the CGE model. In other terms, the household
income is shocked by the change in the wage obtained from the CGE 4w yielding the
logarithm of wage earnings:
log(Y Lls) = log[Ŷ Lls(1 +4w)] (5)
Secondly, the changes in the number of wage workers in the microsimulation LDMSL
must be equal to those observed in the CGE model LDCGEL :
4LDMSL = 4LDCGEL (6)
This equation is crucial to our analysis as the 4LDCGEL determines the level of em-
ployment after the liberalization shock for the whole economy but 4LDMSL determines
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who, the inactive population, has the highest probability of becoming active if the shock
induces an increase in labor demand.
To put in a nutshell, we impose the macroeconomic results obtained from the CGE
model onto the microeconomic level in order to determine the impact of trade liberalization
on the different segments of the Egyptian society.
4 Data
4.1 Micro Data: ELMS 1998
Data used in this study are obtained from the Egyptian Labor Market Survey of
1998 (ELMS). The ELMS is a national-representative household survey covering 5,000
households. These households were selected from a CAPMAS (Central Agency for Pub-
lic Mobilizations and Statistics) master sample prepared in 1995. The questionnaire is
composed of three major sections: (1) a household questionnaire administered to the
head of household or the head’s spouse that contains information on basic demographic
characteristics of household members, movement of household members in and out of the
household since 1998, ownership of durable goods and assets, and housing conditions, (2)
an individual questionnaire administered to the individual him or herself containing infor-
mation on parental background, detailed education histories, activity status, job search
and unemployment, detailed employment characteristics, a module on women’s work, mi-
gration histories, job histories, time use, earnings and fertility. (3) a household enterprise
and income module that elicits information on all agricultural and non-agricultural enter-
prises operated by the household as well as all income sources, including remittances and
transfers.
In the present research, we consider all individuals aged between 15 and 65 years old.
Those can be either active (41 %) or inactive (59%). The inactive population is composed
of individuals out of the labor force, unemployed, self employed or unpaid family workers.
Our working sample consists on 14 796 individuals equally divided between males and
females. And, following an eight-segments division with respect to gender, region and
qualification level, we observe, as shown in table 2, that 34.46%, 34.5% and 31.03% of
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the masculine rural population are respectively illiterate, low skilled and highly skilled.
However, females in rural areas seem to be more concentrated in the illiterate situation
with 57.43% against only 24.70% and 17.88% as low skilled and high skilled respectively.
In contrast, urban areas are characterized by more equality in education between males
and females. For instance, 29,32% of urban males against 28,30% of females have a low
level of education.
[Table 2 about here]
Table 3 represents the mean wages of the working population by segment. Generally,
males, in mean, have higher wages than females regardless the level of education and the
region of residence. Not surprisingly, the segment benefiting from the highest mean wage
is the one of highly skilled males living in urban areas. The latter has a mean wage of
262.7396 against 218.2871 for its female’s counterpart. However, the lowest mean wage
goes for low skilled females living in rural areas.
[Table 3 about here]
4.2 Macro Data: The Social Accounting Matrix 2000-2001
The Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) of Egypt 2000/2001 was constructed by the
National Institute of Planning, an institute attached to the Ministry of Planning. The
structure of the matrix is as follows: it consists of six major accounts: the production
factors, the economic agents, the industries, the composite products, the capital and finally
the taxes which is an independent account of the government one. The SAM incorporates
two production factors: labor and capital, six economic agents: households (rural and
urban), companies (private and public), government and the Rest of the World (RoW).
Regarding the industries, the SAM takes into account 17 branches structured as follows:
two branches for agriculture (crop production and animal production), eleven branches
for industry (oil and mining, tobacco, food industries, spinning and weaving, clothing
(including leather), chemical industries, non-metal industries, industries of basic metals,
metal industries, machinery and equipment and other industries) and finally four branches
for the services sector (construction and electricity, communication and transport, other
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productive services and social services). The composite products account includes the
same sectors mentioned above. Finally, the taxes account includes: direct taxes, indirect
taxes, subsidies and tariffs on imports.
As we need to take into account the heterogeneity of economic agents on the labor mar-
ket, and specifically the gender aspects, we have disaggregated the labor in the Egyptian
SAM into eight different segments according to region, qualification and gender yielding
eight different segments. Such a disaggregation allows us to determine the impact of
trade liberalization on the inequality between males and females, rural and urban areas
and skilled and unskilled workers. This was done using the micro data.
We follow Rutherford et al. (1993) in selecting the benchmark elasticities. Labor-
capital substitution varies across sectors, ranging from 0.43 to 1.99. Trade elasticities are
taken from Konan and Maskus (1997). The substitution elasticity between domestic and
imported goods (both intermediates and consumption) is set at 2.0. The transformation
elasticity between domestic and exported output also is set to 5.0. As to the labor market,
substitution elasticity between rural and urban workers is set to a low value of 0.5. Sub-
stitution between between males and females is slightly higher and fixed to 0.7. Finally,
according to Decaluwe´ et al. (2001), skilled and unskilled workers are less substitutable
with an elasticity equal to 0.5.
5 Results
5.1 Microeconomic Results
Table 4 displays the results of the probit model of participation. The dependent
variable equals to one if the individual l is active i.e a wage worker and equals to zero
otherwise. The model is run separately for each subgroup s. All the results conform to
the literature. The probability of being active increases with age and decreases with the
age squared. And, this is verified for all subgroups. Marriage differently affects males and
females. Married males, contrarily to their females counterparts, have a higher probabil-
ity to be a active relative to single ones. Such results can be explained by the additional
responsibilities that married males should bear and the family burden that their wives
have to encounter. This domestic burden (child care and household chores) increases her
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probability of being a housewife (inactive) rather than being active. In addition, the prob-
ability of being active decreases with the household size for all subgroups. This is due to
the transferability of revenues and tasks among the members of the same household. And,
as expected, the parental education and specifically the father’s education has important
effects on the individual professional carrier and status in the labor market.
[Table 4 about here]
Similarly, in table 5, the results of the Heckman selection model are shown. The
dependent variable here is the logarithm of the individual’s hourly wage estimated by
dividing the weekly wage by the number of working days during the reference week.
The Heckman wage equation is also run separately for each subgroup. It is quite clear
that, contrarily to males, the females’s wages significantly decrease with age. And, when
looking to the results obtained for the skilled population, we observe that the household
size negatively affects the individual’s wage. Moreover, living in rural areas in Egypt seems
to have negative impacts on wages. But, this results can be explained by the higher costs
of living in urban areas as Cairo for instance. An important result of those regressions
is the positive relation between the level of education and wages for all subgroups. For
males, being a skilled worker relative to a non skilled one increases the logarithm of wage
by 74% against an increase of 57.3% for females. A similar result is observed for both
urban and rural subgroups.
[Table 5 about here]
Note that the constants obtained in the wage regressions are then shocked by the
changes in wages that result from the CGE model in order to determine the liberalization
effects on wages of the active population. Results of the CGE are analyzed in the next
section.
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5.2 Macroeconomic Results
In order to assess the effects of trade liberalization, we use a Swiss formula5. The tariff
reduction is computed as follows:
T ∗ =
T ini.Coefficient
T ini + Coefficient
(7)
where T ∗ is the new tariff rate, T ini is the initial tariff rate and Coefficient is the used
coefficient which is equal to the maximum tariff rate. In our case we use an ambitious
coefficient equal to 10%. Three simulations are implemented:
The first simulation and the most ambitious sets the maximum tariff of all the sectors
to 10% through an unconditional trade liberalization. Clearly, it is unrealistic but for the
sake of comparison it is simulated to see to what extent Egypt may benefit and/or lose
from such a liberalization. The second simulation sets the maximum tariff of agriculture
to 10% through an unconditional trade liberalization. As agriculture is one of the most
protected sectors in Egypt, we try to determine the effect of its liberalization especially
that Egypt is a net importer of agriculture products. Finally, the third simulation assesses
another partial liberalization using the Girard formula or the Swiss formula by setting the
maximum tariff of textiles and garments to 10%. The rationale behind such a simulation
is explained by the fact that Egypt has a comparative advantage in this sector. There-
fore, once it is liberalized, it should have a positive impact on employment, exports, and
therefore wages.
Table 6 displays the macroeconomic effects of the 3 simulations. It is worth mentioning
that trade liberalization has a positive effect on the Egyptian economy as total import,
total export and consumption are boosted. Clearly, the more Egypt liberalizes its external
trade, the higher are the gains that are generated in the short run. For instance, when
Egypt liberalizes the textile and garment sectors, total exports are boosted by 0.36% and
total imports by 0.15%. Those modest figures are explained by the fact that Egypt has
5This formula is designed to cut and harmonize tariff rates. It was first introduced by the Swiss
Delegation to the WTO during the Doha Development Round. The aim was to provide a mechanism
where maximum tariffs could be agreed, and where existing low tariff countries would make a commitment
to some reduction
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already liberalized those sectors, this is why more liberalization does not generate high
gains. By contrast, when agriculture is liberalized, those figures increase to reach 1.5%
for total exports and 0.6% for total imports. Finally, when trade is fully liberalized, the
highest gains are generated as total exports are boosted by 5.6% (thanks to a significant
depreciation) and total imports by 2.2% (thanks to lower tariffs).
[Tables 6 about here]
Removing tariffs reduces consumption prices by 0.94% when trade is fully liberalized
raising real revenues of different households. Therefore, total consumption increases by
1% and in turn, urban and rural welfare witness the highest improvement by 0.65% and
1% respectively. Agriculture liberalization yields lower welfare gains (0.1% and 0.3% re-
spectively) but they are still more important than those coming from textile and garments
liberalization (0.02% and 0.05% respectively).
[Tables 7, 8 and 9 about here]
Turning to the labor market, it is quite clear that trade is skill biased. Table 7
shows that when trade is fully liberalized, skilled workers in urban and rural areas are
positively affected. In urban areas, skilled females witness a higher wage variation (0.9%)
than skilled males (0.27%) thanks to higher labor demand especially in chemicals, clothes
and social services. This last sector is one of the most intensive in skilled females after
the manufacturing one. Clearly, females are concentrated in the textile sector since it is
intensive in unskilled labor which is more frequent among females as they are less educated
than males. On the hand, services is an important employer of females as it allows for
a better reconciliation between work and family lives (maternity leaves, flexible working
hours and stability).
As Egypt does not have a comparative advantage in agriculture, when the latter is
liberalized, production shrinks along with the labor demand that reduces more for un-
skilled males and females pushing their wages down by 0.72% and 0.52% respectively
in urban areas. Such a result may be surprising as one can perceive agriculture as an
unskilled-females-intensive sector. In reality, unskilled females working in agriculture,
and particulary in rural areas, usually belong to the informal sector or the subsistence
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work. Such a sector is not taken into account in our analysis as we are focusing only
on the formal one. However, studying the impact of liberalization on informal sector is
on our research agenda as it represents a significant part of the females employment in
general, and the agriculture sector in particular.
Finally, when garments and textiles are liberalized, their imports raise. Although
Egypt has a comparative advantage in garments and textiles, it faces a fierce competition
coming from the Asian countries which are much more competitive. Therefore, domestic
production declines, labor demand decreases by 0.27% for textiles and 1.55% for garments.
This in turn reduces the wage for all segments, especially skilled males and females by
0.04%.
5.3 Microsimulation Results
After replicating the CGE results on the microeconomic level using the Top Down
approach, we can simply determine the effect of trade liberalization on individuals income.
Such an analysis is allowed by the microsimulation as we can undertake a poverty and
inequality analysis using the Lorenz curve, the Gini coefficient and the Theil index.
Table 10 displays the Gini coefficient and the Theil index for according to gender,
qualification and region for our three simulations.
First, it is quite clear that in all the simulations, inequality between skilled and un-
skilled is the most important issue in Egypt as the Gini index goes up from 42.5% to 78%
in the case of the agriculture liberalization, 52% when textile and garments are liberal-
ized and 78.3% when all sectors are liberalized simultaneously. The same patterns can be
observed for the Theil index. This shows to what extent trade liberalization increases the
skill premia as mentioned above.
As to gender inequality, agriculture and total liberalization increase inequality between
males and females (from 42% to 51.5% and 56.5% respectively). Interestingly, textile
liberalization reduces such an inequality as males wages decrease more than females ones.
Finally, regional inequality is negatively affected by agriculture and total liberalization
while it is positively affected by the textiles and garments one. This is due to the fact
that when the latter sector is liberalized, wages decrease for all segments, especially among
urban ones which, in turn reduces the gap between urban and rural areas. By contrast,
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in the other two simulations, this gap increases.
[Table 10]
Those results are represented in Figures 7, 8 and 9 that display the Lorenz curve
for the different labor segments. First, Figure7 shows the same pattern for skilled vs.
unskilled wage workers. Among the latter, inequality is more pronounced. This result
is confirm to the literature on trade effect on the skill premium between skilled and
unskilled. Similarly, having a quick glance on Figure 8, we observe a more egalitarian
income distribution among females relative to their counterparts. Finally, the inequality
scheme for rural vs. urban regions is rather similar as shown in Figure 9.
In conclusion, the most important aspect of inequality is the one between skilled and
unskilled workers. From a policy implication standpoint, the government of Egypt can
reduce such an inequality through an improvement of the education system that increases
the workers qualifications.
[Figures 7, 8 and 9 about here]
6 Conclusion
The present research develops a microsimulation analysis in order to evaluate the im-
pact of trade liberalization policies on the Egyptian labor market taking into consideration
the gender issues. Our analysis aims at identifying the effects of those measures on redistri-
bution aspects. For this, we rely on a macro - micro approach integrating results obtained
from a discrete choice model of labor supply in a Computable General Equilibrium model
(CGE).
The results of the discrete choice model of labor supply show important effects of
marriage on the females labor market choices. Moreover, a higher level of education
significantly affect the individual’s choice. The latter increases the probability of being a
wage worker rather than being inactive.
Our main findings from the CGE model show that welfare increase is triggered by the
price effect of trade liberalization. It is worth mentioning also that trade liberalization
has different effects on each sector. The most important sectors witnessing an increase in
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their exports are: transport services, chemicals and animal products. Imports of garments,
processed food and vegetables raise as Egypt is a net importer of such products. Clearly,
Asian countries have a comparative advantage in those products, that is why Egypt in-
creases its imports of such products, which in turn, boosts the households welfare. Finally,
in the short term, real wages increase but decrease on the long run, which reduces the
households welfare. Such observations highlight the importance of a multilateral trade
liberalization not a unilateral one as mentioned below.
Our research agenda includes some methodological and technical aspects in order to
better assess the effects of trade liberalization. On the one hand, it would be more inter-
esting to take into account not only the tariff imposed by Egypt but also the one imposed
by its trade partners. Such a point should allow us to assess the effect of multilateral trade
liberalization which is more beneficial than unilateral one. This conclusion is in line with
the literature on trade liberalization: a country gains more when its main partners liberal-
ize their trade simultaneously. Furthermore, we have also to disaggregate the Rest of the
World into many agents, namely by introducing Egypt’s main trade partners: U.S.A., E.U
and Arab countries. In addition, and the most important, we have to introduce imperfect
competition in the model. This assumption is more realistic assumption and crucial for
trade liberalization issues. Finally, our simulations have been run in a static framework
without taking into account long run benefits. Our analysis should be extended to assess
the effect of liberalization through a dynamic approach.
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Tables and Figures
1. Descriptive Statistics
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Figure 2:
Nominal and Effective Rates of Protection in the Egyptian Manufacturing Activities
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Figure 3:
Egypt’s Trade: Exports and ImportsEgypt's Trade - Exports and Imports
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Figure 4:
Sectors and Gender
 
Source: F. El-Hamidi, 2008.
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Figure 5:
Micro-simulation Mechanisms: Top Down Approach
 
Output 
Input 
Input 
Output  
CGE model : 
policy shock 
The vector of changes in: 
- Prices:   prices, wages, interest rates, cons prices 
- Volumes: occupational levels 
 
Microeconometric 
model : behavioural 
modelling   
Microsimulation model 
New income levels after simulations 
Source: Adapted from Colombo (2008).
Figure 6:
Production Structure
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Table 3: Mean Wages of the Working Population
Mean Wages
Males Skilled in Rural 173.2372
Unskilled in Rural 129.8379
Skilled in Urban 262.7396
Unskilled in Urban 146.7782
Females Skilled in Rural 132.9048
Unskilled in Rural 89.55001
Skilled in Urban 218.2871
Unskilled in Urban 139.3214
Notes: Constructed using the ELMS 1998.
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Macroeconomic Results
Table 6: Key Macroeconomic Variables
Variables Textile Agriculture Total
GDP 0.00 0.02 -0.02
Investment -0.08 -0.39 -1.52
Total Exports 0.36 1.53 5.57
Total Imports 0.15 0.58 2.21
Total Cons. 0.04 0.24 0.99
CPI -0.04 -0.25 -0.94
Welfare Rural 0.05 0.30 1.03
Welfare Urban 0.02 0.11 0.65
Exchange Rate 0.19 1.00 3.21
Gov. Revenues -0.32 -1.46 -6.30
Notes: (i.) Source: Authors calculations.
(ii.) Those figures are calculated with respect to the Base Year scenario.
Table 7: Macroeconomic Results: Real Wage Variations
Variables Textile Agriculture Total
Urban Male Skilled -0.04 0.33 0.27
Rural Male Skilled -0.05 0.49 0.40
Urban Female Skilled -0.04 0.91 0.91
Rural Female Skilled -0.01 0.85 1.16
Urban Male Unskilled 0.01 -0.72 -0.43
Rural Male Unskilled -0.01 -0.42 -0.25
Urban Female Unskilled -0.01 -0.52 -0.39
Rural Female Unskilled -0.02 0.19 0.33
Notes: (i.) Source: Authors calculations.
(ii.) Those figures are calculated with respect to the Base Year scenario.
28
T
ab
le
8:
L
ab
or
D
em
an
d
V
ar
ia
ti
on
s
fo
r
M
al
es
M
a
le
s
U
rb
a
n
S
k
il
le
d
R
u
ra
l
S
k
il
le
d
U
rb
a
n
U
n
sk
il
le
d
R
u
ra
l
U
n
sk
il
le
d
T
e
x
ti
le
A
g
r
T
o
ta
l
T
e
x
ti
le
A
g
r
T
o
ta
l
T
e
x
ti
le
A
g
r
T
o
ta
l
T
e
x
ti
le
A
g
r
T
o
ta
l
A
G
R
V
E
G
0.
09
-2
.3
5
-1
.7
8
0.
09
-2
.4
2
-1
.8
4
0.
07
-1
.8
3
-1
.4
4
0.
07
-1
.9
8
-1
.5
2
A
G
R
A
N
M
0.
09
-2
.2
9
-1
.6
2
0.
09
-2
.3
6
-1
.6
7
0.
06
-1
.7
7
-1
.2
7
0.
07
-1
.9
1
-1
.3
6
IN
D
O
IL
0.
09
0.
24
0.
80
0.
10
0.
16
0.
74
0.
07
0.
77
1.
15
0.
08
0.
62
1.
06
IN
D
F
O
O
D
0.
11
2.
00
-1
.4
9
0.
11
1.
92
-1
.5
5
0.
08
2.
54
-1
.1
4
0.
09
2.
38
-1
.2
3
IN
D
T
O
B
0.
13
0.
38
-1
4.
94
0.
13
0.
29
-1
5.
00
0.
10
0.
91
-1
4.
64
0.
11
0.
75
-1
4.
72
IN
D
S
P
IN
-1
.5
5
0.
84
0.
75
-1
.5
4
0.
76
0.
69
-1
.5
7
1.
37
1.
10
-1
.5
6
1.
22
1.
01
IN
D
C
L
O
-0
.2
7
0.
36
1.
43
-0
.2
7
0.
28
1.
36
-0
.3
0
0.
89
1.
78
-0
.2
9
0.
74
1.
69
IN
D
C
H
M
0.
14
0.
57
1.
68
0.
15
0.
49
1.
61
0.
12
1.
10
2.
03
0.
13
0.
95
1.
94
IN
D
N
M
E
T
0.
10
0.
31
-0
.9
9
0.
11
0.
22
-1
.0
6
0.
08
0.
84
-0
.6
5
0.
09
0.
68
-0
.7
4
IN
D
B
A
S
0.
16
0.
59
0.
15
0.
16
0.
50
0.
08
0.
13
1.
12
0.
50
0.
14
0.
96
0.
41
IN
D
M
E
T
0.
08
0.
32
-2
.6
7
0.
08
0.
24
-2
.7
4
0.
05
0.
85
-2
.3
3
0.
06
0.
70
-2
.4
2
IN
D
E
N
G
0.
07
0.
13
-1
.6
3
0.
07
0.
04
-1
.6
9
0.
05
0.
66
-1
.2
8
0.
05
0.
50
-1
.3
7
IN
D
O
T
H
0.
16
0.
60
-2
.1
0
0.
16
0.
52
-2
.1
6
0.
13
1.
14
-1
.7
5
0.
14
0.
98
-1
.8
4
S
E
R
T
R
A
0.
20
0.
80
2.
91
0.
20
0.
71
2.
84
0.
17
1.
33
3.
27
0.
18
1.
17
3.
18
S
E
R
O
T
H
0.
03
0.
29
0.
47
0.
03
0.
21
0.
41
0.
00
0.
82
0.
82
0.
01
0.
67
0.
73
S
O
C
S
E
R
0.
09
0.
14
0.
94
0.
09
0.
06
0.
88
0.
06
0.
67
1.
30
0.
07
0.
52
1.
20
N
o
te
s:
(i
.)
S
o
u
rc
e:
A
u
th
o
rs
ca
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s.
(i
i.
)
T
h
o
se
fi
g
u
re
s
a
re
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
w
it
h
re
sp
ec
t
to
th
e
B
a
se
Y
ea
r
sc
en
a
ri
o
.
29
T
ab
le
9:
L
ab
or
D
em
an
d
V
ar
ia
ti
on
s
fo
r
F
em
al
es
F
e
m
a
le
s
U
rb
a
n
S
k
il
le
d
R
u
ra
l
S
k
il
le
d
U
rb
a
n
U
n
sk
il
le
d
R
u
ra
l
U
n
sk
il
le
d
T
e
x
ti
le
A
g
r
T
o
ta
l
T
e
x
ti
le
A
g
r
T
o
ta
l
T
e
x
ti
le
A
g
r
T
o
ta
l
T
e
x
ti
le
A
g
r
T
o
ta
l
A
G
R
V
E
G
0.
09
-2
.6
3
-2
.0
9
0.
07
-2
.6
9
-2
.3
1
0.
08
-1
.9
4
-1
.4
5
0.
08
-2
.3
7
-1
.9
1
A
G
R
A
N
M
0.
09
-2
.5
7
-1
.9
2
0.
07
-2
.6
3
-2
.1
4
0.
07
-1
.8
7
-1
.2
8
0.
08
-2
.3
1
-1
.7
4
IN
D
O
IL
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
0.
00
IN
D
F
O
O
D
0.
11
1.
62
-1
.8
9
0.
09
1.
65
-2
.0
3
0.
09
2.
35
-1
.2
4
0.
09
1.
99
-1
.6
3
IN
D
T
O
B
0.
13
0.
00
-1
5.
28
0.
11
0.
03
-1
5.
41
0.
12
0.
72
-1
4.
73
0.
12
0.
36
-1
5.
06
IN
D
S
P
IN
-1
.5
4
0.
46
0.
35
-1
.5
6
0.
49
0.
20
-1
.5
6
1.
18
1.
00
-1
.5
6
0.
82
0.
61
IN
D
C
L
O
-0
.2
7
-0
.0
1
1.
02
-0
.2
9
0.
02
0.
87
-0
.2
8
0.
70
1.
68
-0
.2
8
0.
35
1.
28
IN
D
C
H
M
0.
15
0.
19
1.
27
0.
13
0.
22
1.
12
0.
13
0.
91
1.
93
0.
13
0.
55
1.
54
IN
D
N
M
E
T
0.
10
-0
.0
7
-1
.3
9
0.
08
-0
.0
4
-1
.5
4
0.
09
0.
64
-0
.7
5
0.
09
0.
29
-1
.1
3
IN
D
B
A
S
0.
16
0.
21
-0
.2
5
0.
14
0.
24
-0
.4
0
0.
15
0.
93
0.
40
0.
15
0.
57
0.
01
IN
D
M
E
T
0.
08
-0
.0
5
-3
.0
7
0.
06
-0
.0
2
-3
.2
1
0.
06
0.
66
-2
.4
3
0.
06
0.
31
-2
.8
1
IN
D
E
N
G
0.
07
-0
.2
5
-2
.0
2
0.
05
-0
.2
2
-2
.1
7
0.
06
0.
46
-1
.3
8
0.
06
0.
11
-1
.7
6
IN
D
O
T
H
0.
16
0.
23
-2
.4
9
0.
14
0.
26
-2
.6
3
0.
14
0.
94
-1
.8
5
0.
14
0.
59
-2
.2
3
S
E
R
T
R
A
0.
20
0.
39
2.
47
0.
18
0.
44
2.
33
0.
18
1.
11
3.
14
0.
18
0.
77
2.
75
S
E
R
O
T
H
0.
03
-0
.1
1
0.
05
0.
01
-0
.0
7
-0
.0
9
0.
02
0.
60
0.
70
0.
02
0.
26
0.
32
S
O
C
S
E
R
0.
09
-0
.2
6
0.
52
0.
07
-0
.2
2
0.
38
0.
08
0.
45
1.
17
0.
08
0.
11
0.
79
N
o
te
s:
(i
.)
S
o
u
rc
e:
A
u
th
o
rs
ca
lc
u
la
ti
o
n
s.
(i
i.
)
T
h
o
se
fi
g
u
re
s
a
re
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
w
it
h
re
sp
ec
t
to
th
e
B
a
se
Y
ea
r
sc
en
a
ri
o
.
30
Microsimulation Results
Table 10: Inequality Indices by Gender, Qualification Level and Region
Baseline Agriculture Textile All sectors
Gender Gini coefficient 42.53% 51.5% 33.5% 56.5%
Theil Index 0.36 0.52 0.20 0.64
Skill Gini coefficient 42.53% 77.9% 52.1% 78.3%
Theil Index 0.36 1.26 0.47 1.28
Region Gini coefficient 42.53% 55.4% 31.8% 59.3%
Theil Index 0.36 0.55 0.19 0.64
Notes: (i.) Source: Authors calculations.
(ii.)
Figure 7:
Lorenz Curve: By Qualification
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Figure 8:
Lorenz Curve: By Gender
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Female_1 Female_0
y
 
Figure 9:
Lorenz Curve: By Region
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Appendix 1: List of sectors
The Egyptian SAM includes 17 sectors. For the sake of modeling, two service sectors
have been merged in order to avoid zero values present in the SAM. Those sectors are
distributed as follows: 2 agricultural sectors, 11 industrial ones and 3 services sectors as
follows:
Table 11: List of sectors included in the SAM
Abbreviation Sector
AGRVEG Agriculture vegetal production
AGRANM Agriculture animal production
INDOIL Oil and extraction industry
INDFOOD Food industry
INDTOB Tobacco industry
INDSPIN Spinning and weaving industry
INDCLO Clothes(includes leather)
INDCHM Chemical industries
INDNMET Non-metal industries
INDBAS Basic metal industries
INDMET Metal industries
INDENG Enginery and machinery industries
INDOTH Other industries
SERTRA Transport and communication services
SEROTH Other services
SOCSER Social services
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Appendix 2: The Model Notation
Indices definition
h Household of type h
i and j Sectors of the economy (16 sectors)
l Individuals and type of labor
t Time index
Parameters definition
1- Production functions
νj Share of the value added in the production (Leontief) of sector j
ioj Share of intermediary consumption in the production (Leontief) of sector j
aijij Intermediary consumption of good i by unity of production of sector j
δj Share of sector j value added of in GDP at factor cost
2- CES function between capital and labor
Avaj Scale parameter of the value added CES function of sector j
αvaj Share parameter of the value added CES function of sector j
ρvaj Substitution parameter between labor and capital
σvaj Substitution elasticity (value added function)
3- CES function between types of labor
First level
Aregj Scale parameter of the labor CES function in urban/rural
ρregj Substitution parameter between labor in urban/rural
σregi Substitution elasticity parameter among labor in urban/rural
αregj Share parameter of the labor CES function in urban/rural
Second level
AUR,genj Scale parameter of the labor CES function among males/females in urban
ρUR,genj Substitution parameter between labor among males/females in urban
σUR,geni Substitution elasticity parameter among males/females in urban
αUR,genj Share parameter of the labor CES function among males/females in urban
ARU,genj Scale parameter of the labor CES function among males/females in rural
ρRU,genj Substitution parameter between labor among males/females in rural
σRU,geni Substitution elasticity parameter among males/females in rural
αRU,genj Share parameter of the labor CES function among males/females in rural
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Third level
AURMA,sklj Scale parameter of the labor CES function skilled/unskilled males in urban
ρURMA,sklj Substitution parameter between labor among skilled/unskilled males in urban
σURMA,skli Substitution elasticity parameter among skilled/unskilled males in urban
αURMA,sklj Share parameter of the labor CES function among skilled/unskilled males in urban
AURFE,sklj Scale parameter of the labor CES function skilled/unskilled females in urban
ρURFE,sklj Substitution parameter between labor among skilled/unskilled females in urban
σURFE,skli Substitution elasticity parameter among skilled/unskilled females in urban
αURFE,sklj Share parameter of the labor CES function among skilled/unskilled females in urban
ARUMA,sklj Scale parameter of the labor CES function skilled/unskilled males in rural
ρRUMA,sklj Substitution parameter between labor among skilled/unskilled males in rural
σRUMA,skli Substitution elasticity parameter among skilled/unskilled males in rural
αRUMA,sklj Share parameter of the labor CES function among skilled/unskilled males in rural
ARUFE,sklj Scale parameter of the labor CES function skilled/unskilled females in rural
ρRUFE,sklj Substitution parameter between labor among skilled/unskilled females in urban
σRUFE,skli Substitution elasticity parameter among skilled/unskilled females in rural
αRUFE,sklj Share parameter of the labor CES function among skilled/unskilled females in rural
4- Demand functions
ϕh Household h propensity to save
γih Budgetary share of good i in the income of household h
µi Share of investment demand of sector i in total investment
λHw Share of Household h in the wages bill
Cmini,h Minimal consumption of good i by household h
5- Tax rates
txj Indirect taxes rate applied on sector j products
tmj Import tariff rate applied on sector j products
tej Export tariff rate applied on sector j products
tpj Production tax rate applied on sector j
tyhh Direct tax rate applied on household h income
tyf Direct tax rate applied on firms income
6- CES function between imports and domestic production
Amj Scale parameter of the Armington CES function
αmj Share parameter of the Armington CES function
ρmj Substitution parameter
σmj Substitution elasticity (Armington function)
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7- CET function between exports and domestic production
Bej Scale parameter of the CET production function
βej Share parameter of the CET production function
τ ej Transformation elasticity (CET production function)
εej Price elasticity
κej Transformation parameter
EXDoj Scale parameter of exports
Variables definition
A- Endogenous variables
1- Production
V Aj Value added of sector j
XSj Production of sector j
XXSj Production of sector j at basic prices
CIj Total intermediary consumption of sector j
DIi,j Intermediary demand of product i by sector j
2- Production factors
KDj Capital demand by sector j
LS Labor supply
LDj Labor demand by sector j
Wj Wage rate in sector I
First level
LFDUR,j Labor demand of sector j in urban areas
LFDRU,j Labor demand of sector j in rural areas
WUR,j Wage rate of sector j in urban areas
WRU,j Wage rate of sector j in rural areas
Second level
LFDURMA,j Labor demand of males working sector j in urban areas
LFDRUMA,j Labor demand of males working sector j in rural areas
WURMA,j Wage rate of males working sector j in urban areas
WRUMA,j Wage rate of males working sector j in rural areas
LFDURFE,j Labor demand of females working sector j in urban areas
LFDRUFE,j Labor demand of females working sector j in rural areas
WURFE,j Wage rate of females working sector j in urban areas
WRUFE,j Wage rate of females working sector j in rural areas
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Third level
LFDURMASK,j Labor demand of skilled males working sector j in urban areas
LFDRUMASK,j Labor demand of skilled males working sector j in rural areas
WURMASK,j Wage rate of skilled males working sector j in urban areas
WRUMASK,j Wage rate of skilled males working sector j in rural areas
LFDURFESK,j Labor demand of skilled females working sector j in urban areas
LFDRUFESK,j Labor demand of skilled females working sector j in rural areas
WURFESK,j Wage rate of skilled females working sector j in urban areas
WRUFESK,j Wage rate of skilled females working sector j in rural areas
LFDURMAUK,j Labor demand of unskilled males working sector j in urban areas
LFDRUMAUK,j Labor demand of unskilled males working sector j in rural areas
WURMAUK,j Wage rate of unskilled males working sector j in urban areas
WRUMAUK,j Wage rate of unskilled males working sector j in rural areas
LFDURFEUK,j Labor demand of unskilled females working sector j in urban areas
LFDRUFEUK,j Labor demand of unskilled females working sector j in rural areas
WURFEUK,j Wage rate of unskilled females working sector j in urban areas
WRUFEUK,j Wage rate of unskilled females working sector j in rural areas
3- Prices
rj Capital return in sector j
Pvj Value added price of sector j
Pcj Market price of the composite good belonging to sector j
Pj Production price on factor cost of sector j
Plj Producer price of sector j product sold on the domestic market
Pfobj Fob price of the exported good j
Pmj Domestic price of the imported good j
Pej Producer price of the exported good j
Pinvj Investment price index
PCIh Consumer price index for household h
e Nominal exchange rate
4- Revenues and Savings
Y Hh Household h income
Y DHh Disposable income of household h
Y F Firms income
Y G Government income
SHh Household h savings
SF Firms savings
SG Government savings
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5- Tax revenues
TDHh Receipts from direct taxes of household h
TDF Receipts from direct taxes of firms
TIj Receipts from indirect of sector j
TIMj Receipts from import tariffs of goods j
TIEj Receipts from export tariffs of goods j
TIPj Receipts from production taxes
6- External Trade
EXj Export supply of product j
EXDj Export demand of product j
Mj Import demand of product j
Dj Domestic production of sector j sold on the domestic market
Qj Supply of composite product belonging to sector j
7- Final Demand
Ci,h Consumption of good i by household h
INVi Investment demand of product i
DITi Total intermediary demand of input i
IT Gross fixed capital formation
ITV OL Volume of total investment
EVh Equivalent variation of household h
8- Other variables
savadj Adjustment variable for investment and savings
Leon Walras law verification variable
B- Exogenous variables
wg Worker L wage rate in government
Gi Public consumption of product i
LDG Labor demand by public sector
TGh Transfers made by the government to household h
DIVh Dividends distributed by firms to household h
Pwmj International import price of product j (foreign currency)
Pwej International export price of product j (foreign currency)
Pindex GDP deflator, nume´raire
CAB Current account balance (external savings)
TRROW,h Transfers from the Rest of the World to household h
TRh,f Transfers from household h to the firms
TRROW,f Transfers from the Rest of the World to the firms
TRG,f Transfers from the government to the firms
TRROW,G Transfers from the Rest of the World to the government
TRG,ROW Transfers from the government to the Rest of the World
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The Model Equations
1- Production Bloc
XSj = min[(
CIj
ioj
)(
V Aj
νj
)] (A1)
XXSj = XSj.tpj (A2)
V Aj = A
va
j [α
va
j LD
−ρvaj
j + (1− αvaj )KD
−ρvaj
j ]
−1
ρva
j (A3)
CIj = iojXSj (A4)
DIij = aijijCIj (A5)
LDj = (
αvaj
1− αvaj
)σ
va
j (
rj
Wj
)σ
va
j KDj (A6)
First level
LDj = A
reg
j [α
reg
j LFD
−ρregj
UR,j + (1− αregj )LFD
−ρregj
RU,j ]
−1
ρ
reg
j (A7)
LFDUR,j = (
αregj
1− αregj
)σ
reg
j (
WRU,j
WUR,j
)σ
reg
j LFDRU,j (A8)
Wj = (WUR,jLFDUR,j +WRU,jLFDRU,j)/LDj (A9)
Second level
LFDUR,j = A
UR,gen
j [α
UR,gen
j LFD
−ρUR,genj
URFE,j + (1− αUR,genj )LFD
−ρUR,genj
URMA,j ]
−1
ρ
UR,gen
j (A10)
LFDURMA,j = (
αUR,genj
1− αUR,genj
)σ
UR,gen
j (
WURFE,j
WURMA,j
)σ
UR,gen
j LFDURFE,j (A11)
WUR,j = (WURMA,jLFDURMA,j +WURFE,jLFDURFE,j)/LFDUR,j (A12)
LFDRU,j = A
RU,gen
j [α
RU,gen
j LFD
−ρRU,genj
RUFE,j + (1− αRU,genj )LFD
−ρRU,genj
RUMA,j ]
−1
ρ
RU,gen
j (A13)
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LFDRUMA,j = (
αRU,genj
1− αRU,genj
)σ
RU,gen
j (
WRUFE,j
WRUMA,j
)σ
RU,gen
j LFDRUFE,j (A14)
WRU,j = (WRUMA,jLFDRUMA,j +WRUFE,jLFDRUFE,j)/LFDRU,j (A15)
Third level
LFDURMA,j = A
URMA,skl
j [α
URMA,skl
j LFD
−ρURMA,sklj
URMASK,j
+(1− αURMA,sklj )LFD
−ρURMA,sklj
URMAUK,j]
−1
ρ
URMA,skl
j (A16)
LFDURMASK,j = (
αURMA,sklj
1− αURMA,sklj
)σ
URMA,skl
j ×
(
WURMAUK,j
WURMASK,j
)σ
URMA,skl
j LFDURMAUK,j (A17)
WURMA,j = (WURMASK,jLFDURMASK,j
+WURMAUK,jLFDURMAUK,j)/LFDURMA,j (A18)
LFDRUMA,j = A
RUMA,skl
j [α
RUMA,skl
j LFD
−ρRUMA,sklj
RUMASK,j
+(1− αRUMA,sklj )LFD
−ρRUMA,sklj
RUMAUK,j]
−1
ρ
RUMA,skl
j (A19)
LFDRUMASK,j = (
αRUMA,sklj
1− αRUMA,sklj
)σ
RUMA,skl
j ×
(
WRUMAUK,j
WRUMASK,j
)σ
RUMA,skl
j LFDRUMAUK,j (A20)
WRUMA,j = (WRUMASK,jLFDRUMASK,j
+WRUMAUK,jLFDRUMAUK,j)/LFDRUMA,j (A21)
LFDURFE,j = A
URFE,skl
j [α
URFE,skl
j LFD
−ρURFE,sklj
URFESK,j
+(1− αURFE,sklj )LFD
−ρURFE,sklj
URFEUK,j ]
−1
ρ
URFE,skl
j (A22)
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LFDURFESK,j = (
αURFE,sklj
1− αURFE,sklj
)σ
URFE,skl
j ×
(
WURFEUK,j
WURFESK,j
)σ
URFE,skl
j LFDURFEUK,j (A23)
WURFE,j = (WURFESK,jLFDURFESK,j
+WURFEUK,jLFDURFEUK,j)/LFDURFE,j (A24)
LFDRUFE,j = A
RU,skl
j [α
RUFE,skl
j LFD
−ρRUFE,sklj
RUFESK,j
+(1− αRUFE,sklj )LFD
−ρRUFE,sklj
RUFEUK,j ]
−1
ρ
RUFE,skl
j (A25)
LFDRUFESK,j = (
αRUFE,sklj
1− αRUFE,sklj
)σ
RUFE,skl
j ×
(
WRUFEUK,j
WRUFESK,j
)σ
RUFE,skl
j LFDRUFEUK,j (A26)
WRUFE,j = (WRUFESK,jLFDRUFESK,j
+WRUFEUK,jLFDRUFEUK,j)/LFDRUFE,j (A27)
2- Revenues and Savings Bloc
Y Hh = λ
h
w
16∑
j=1
LDj.w + TRG,h +DIVh + TRROW,h + λ
h
w.LGG (A28)
Y DHh = Y Hh − TDh − TRh,e (A29)
Y F =
16∑
j=1
rjKDj + TRROW,f +
hr∑
h=hu
TRh,f + TRG,f (A30)
SHh = ϕhY DHh (A31)
SF = Y F −
hr∑
h=hu
DIVh − TDF (A32)
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3- Government Revenues and Savings
TIPj = tpjPjXSj (A33)
TIj = txj(PljDj) + txj(1 + tmj + ttj)etPwmjMj (A34)
TIMj = tmjPwmjeMj (A35)
TIEj = tejPejEXj (A36)
TDHh = tyhhY Hh (A37)
TDF = tyfY F (A38)
Y G =
16∑
j=1
TIMj +
16∑
j=1
TIEj +
16∑
j=1
TIj
+
hr∑
h=hu
TDHh + TDF + TRROW,G (A39)
SG = Y G−
16∑
j=1
Gi −
hr∑
h=hu
TRh − TRG,f − wLDG − TRG,ROW (A40)
4- Final Demand Bloc
PCiCi,h = PCiC
min
i,h + γih(Y DHh −
∑
i
PCiC
min
ih ) (A41)
(A42)
INVi =
µiIT
Pci
(A43)
DITi =
16∑
j=1
DIij (A44)
5- Prices Bloc
Pvj =
PjXSj −∑16i=1 PciDIi,j
V Aj
(A45)
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rj =
PvjV Aj − wjLDj
KDj
(A46)
Pmj = ePwmj(1 + tmj)(1 + txj) (A47)
Pej =
ePfobj
(1 + tej)
(A48)
Pcj = (1 + txj)
PljDj + PmjMj
Qj
(A49)
Pj =
PljDj + PejEXj
XSj
(A50)
Pinvj =
∏
(
Pcj
µj
)µj (A51)
Pindex =
16∑
j=1
Pvjδj (A52)
PCIh =
16∑
i=1
γhi.PCi (A53)
6- International Trade Bloc
XSj = B
e
j [β
e
jEX
−κej
j + (1− βej )D
−κej
j ]
− 1
κe
j (A54)
EXj = [(
1− βej
βej
)(
Pej
Plj
)]τ
e
jDj (A55)
EXDj = EXD
o
j (
Pwej
Pfobj
)ε
e
j (A56)
Qj = A
m
j [α
m
j M
−ρmj
j + (1− αmj )D
−ρmj
j ]
− 1
ρm
j (A57)
Mj = [(
αmj
1− αmj
)(
Pdj
Pmj
)]σ
m
j Dj (A58)
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CAB = e
16∑
j=1
PwmjMj + TRG,ROW − TRROW,h − TRROW,G −
TRROW,f − e
16∑
j=1
PfobjEXj (A59)
7- Equilibrium Equations Bloc
LS =
16∑
j=1
LDj + LDG (A60)
Qi = DITi +
hr∑
h=hu
Ci,h + INVi +Gi (A61)
IT =
hr∑
h=hu
SHh + SF + SG+ CAB (A62)
IT = Pinv.
∑
Indi (A63)
ITV OL =
IT
P inv
(A64)
EXDj = EXj (A65)
EVh = (
∏
i
(PCOi/PCi)
γi,h ∗ Y Hh)− Y HOh (A66)
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